This paper presents a theoretical model withmicro-foundations that captures some important features ofPakistan's economy which have emergedin sixty-four years of its history.A comparison of Pakistan's economic performance during different regimes shows that macroeconomic fundamentals tend to show an improvement during the autocratic regimes as compared with those prevailing during democratic regimes. In particular, periods of autocratic regimes are typically characterized by low inflation, robust growth and low level of bureaucratic corruption due to better governance. In contrast, the economic performance during the democratic regimes has been observed to worsen with weak governance and high levels of corruption, high inflation due partly to reliance on seigniorage to finance public spending, and lackluster growth. Using annual data from 1950 to 2011, computational modeling is carried outby applying Markov-Regime switching technique with maximum-likelihood procedures.The estimation results based on empirical modeling setup are supportiveof the above stylized-facts and also confirm theimplications of the theoretical model.
INTRODUCTION
Political regimes in Pakistan have strongly influenced the economic outcomes. Whereas the autocratic regimes have tended to exhibit good economic performance with low and stable inflation, robust growth, and fiscal discipline helped by relatively high revenue generation and checks on public expenditure, the democratic regimes have been marked by macroeconomic instability and sluggish economic growth. In addition, autocratic regimes also witnessed relatively stable external sector along with low trade deficit and high capital inflows in the form of foreign direct investments and portfolio investments, which indicates high level of confidence of foreign investors in the domestic economy. On the other hand, key economic indicators have generally deteriorated during different episodes of democratic regimes.
1 Table 1 summarizesthe relative performance of selected macroeconomic variables across different political regimes. Variable List:RGDPgr = Average growth of real gross domestic product; TFPgr = Average growth of total factor productivity; PINVgr=Average growth of real private investment; BBR = Average of Budget Balance ratio to GDP (in percent); ER = Average Exchange rate; INF = Average inflation rate (in percent); UR = Average Unemployment rate; M2gr = Average growth in broad money (M2); Corrp = Aveage level of Corruption and Gov = Average Level of Governance. * For political regime categorization, please refer to table A4 in appendix. Further, shaded rows represent autocratic regimes.
Source: Author's calculations. For data sources and description of variables, please refer section 3. 1 For comprehensive comparison of both regimes, see Iqbal et al., (2008) , and Zaidi (2006) . - 
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The economy grew more than 5 percent per annum on average during autocratic regimes, which is 1.5 percentage points higher than the average growth rate observed during democratic regimes. Similarly, in all autocratic regimes, average economic growth remained above 5 percent with the exception of the second regime in which average economic growth was 2.74 percent. However, in the case of all democratic regimes average annual growth remainedin the range from 2 percent to 5 percent. Therefore, more than 5 percent average annual growth across all autocratic regimes signifies the relatively strong macroeconomic fundamentals during these regimes. Similarly, growth in total factor productivity (TFP) during autocratic regimes outstripped the same in democratic eras: average annual growth of TFP during autocratic regimes was 1.19 percent as compared with TFP growth of -0.15 percent during the democratic regimes. A look at other macroeconomic indicators also shows that the economic performance during the autocratic regimes has been much better than that observed during the democratic regimes. For example, real private investment is a leading indicator of confidence the general public has in the government and its policies. Growth performance of real investment in autocratic eras has been far better than in the democratic regimes. Average growth in real investment in autocratic regimes was 5.67 percent per annum as compared with 3.70 percent during the democratic regimes.
Autocratic regimes have also outperformedthe democratic regimes in terms of fiscal discipline and price stability. Consider, for example, the budget balance ratio which is the ratio of fiscal balance to GDP; the higher the ratio in absolute terms the worse is the fiscal position.
Barring short periods where democratic regimes have a slight edge over autocratic regimes, the former have mostly outperformed the latter in terms of fiscal discipline: average budge balance ratio in autocratic regimes is -8.1 percent whereas in democratic regimes the same is -7.9 percent. In terms of price stability, the democratic regimes have often been marked by high levels of inflation: average inflation in autocratic regimes stood at 4.9 percent per annum as compared with 10 percent for democratic regimes.
What factors could explain the differences in economic performance during autocratic and democratic regimes? A growing and influential body of empirical research has sought to identifythe causes of poor economic outcomes as reflected in high inflation and low economic growth. There is a near consensus in the literature that poor economic outcomes are often associated with lack of good governance and poor state institutions which promote rent seeking and corruption thus impeding the process of economic growth. 2 In the case of Pakistan, few studies have examined the role of governance and 2 See for instance, Baumol (1990) , Murphy et al., (1991) , Acemoglu (1995) , Mauro (1995) and Baumol (2004) .
-5- The above studies are mostly empirical in nature and lack theoretical foundations without which it is difficult to explain how governance, democracy, political instability, quality of institutions and other deeper determinants impact inflation and growth. This study fills the gap in the literature by developing a theoretical model with micro-foundations thatcaptures someof the highlighted features of Pakistan's economy. Furthermore, using actual data, computational modeling is doneby applying Markov-Regime switching technique with maximum-likelihood procedures.Theestimationresults based on empirical modeling setup are in line with the stylizedfacts and also confirm the intuitive implications of the theoretical model. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the literature that explores the links between corruption, quality of governance, inflation and economic growth.
Section 3 presents theoretical model. Section 4 describes data and empirical methodology.
Main findings are discussed in section 5 and the concluding remarksare stated in section 6.
HOW CORRUPTION AND GOVERNANCE LEAD TO INFLATION AND ECONOMIC

GROWTH?
Cross country studies provide many plausible explanations of persistence of high inflation with low economic growth. In general, high inflation might be associated with market imperfections, exchange rates fluctuations, cost-push factors such as food supply shortages, energy inflation in the case of oil importing countries and conventional demand pull factors including private Several empirical studies on inflation-growth nexus have found that high and persistent inflation is harmful to economic growth whereas low and stable inflation is considered as conducive for -6-the process of economic growth. For example, Khan and Senhadji (2001) estimatethe threshold levels of inflation both for advance and emerging economies. They find that up to these threshold levels growth is positively related with inflation and beyond these levels, inflation exerts a negative effect on economic growth.In particular, the threshold estimates are 1-3 percent and 7-11 percent for industrial and developing countries, respectively. Figure 1 shows the relationship between CPI inflation and real GDP growth and between CPI inflation and M2 growth for OECD 3 (organization for economic corporation and development) and developing countries 4 for the sample 1984 to 2010. This figure shows positive relationship between CPI inflation and M2 growth for both panels of countries. For developing countries this relationship is much stronger as where expectations are assumed to be adaptive, there could be a likelihood of higher than social optimal inflation rate in the long-run. Alesina(1987) , Alesina(1989) , Rogoff and Sibert(1988) consider rational expectationsapproach as opposed to adaptive expectation schemes and come up with similar results. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) invoke deficit bias hypothesis and explain that alternating governments are either uncertain of each others' preferences or they disagree over the composition of public spending that gives rise to excessively high budget deficits. This deficit bias thus yields suboptimal outcomes which put pressure on inflation in both short and long run. Thus in this case inflation is a result of opportunistic behavior by alternative governments that are in office and try to influence myopic voters for reelection.
Alesina and Drazen (1991) expound the war of attrition philosophy which is the extension of Hibbs ' (1977) findings.These studiesfocus on the cyclical behavior of the economy and consider inflation as the result of ideological differences of political parties that come to power alternately within a setting of asymmetric information among key political parties. The higher the number of political parties in a legislative council, the higher the likelihood of conflict, the harder it is to reach agreements and the higher the increase in fiscal which ultimately leads to high inflation.
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The second line of research attemptsto explain the reasons of high inflation rates within an optimal planning framework with time inconsistency problems.These problems occur as a result of the game between policy making authorities and the private sector agents. The seminal attempts in this direction are Kydland and Prescott (1977) , Barro and Gordon (1983a) , Barro and Gordon (1983b), Backus and Driffill (1985) andRogoff (1985) . These studies explain the high money supply growth and inflation rates by using game theoretic approaches. The main argument is that the policy makers in certain cases take advantage of discretionary powers with the assumption of asymmetric information while preparing policies to reduce unemployment or to increase economic growth at the cost of higher inflation. Private agents on the other hand are rational and aware of thesehidden incentives.They do not trust policy rules unless some kind of strict commitments exist. Therefore, credibility plays a major role in such cases. This body of research also proposes reputation and delegation as possible solutions to lower money growth and inflation rates. institutions lack an efficient tax system, which results in reliance on seigniorage. To meet the demand for public expenditures governments print more money which eventually leads to higher inflation.
It is generally accepted that these three explanations for high money growth and high inflation can help in understanding the situation in developing countries. However, there could be some other plausiblereasons due to the existence of bad governance, poor quality of institutions and high level of corruption activitiesin developing countries which can cause high inflation rates along with low economic growth. Figure 2 shows the relationship between governance and corruption with CPI inflation and real GDP growth for sixty OECD and developing countries.
5 See, for instance, Phelps (1973) , Vegh (1989) , and Aizenman (1992).
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];b) corruption may undermine the protection of the property rights, create obstacles to doing business and impede innovation and technological transfer [Hall and Jones (1999) and North (1990) ];d) corruption may cause firms to expand less rapidly, to adopt inefficient technologies and to shift their operations to the informal sector [Svensson, (2005) ];e) corruption may limit the extent of a country's trade openness and reduce inflows of foreign investment [Pellegrini and Gerlagh(2004) and Wei (2000) ]; f) corruption may lead to costly concealment and detection of illegal income, resulting in a deadweight loss of resources [Blackburn et al.(2006) and Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio(2007)]; g) corruption may compromise human development In terms of public finances, corruption and poor governance may independently impact both the expenditure and revenue sides of the government′s budget: for any given state of the latter, corruption can distort the composition of expenditures in ways described above; for any given state of the former, corruption can alter the manner by which revenues must be generated, as suggested by other empirical evidence. Thus Ghura (1998), Imam and Jacobs (2007) and Davoodi (1997, 2000) conclude that corruption reduces total tax revenues by reducing the revenues from almost all taxable sources.The implication is that, ceteris paribus, other means of raising income must be sought, and one of the most tempting of these is seigniorage. Significantly, it has been found that inflation is positively related to the incidence of corruption, see for instance, Al-Marhubi (2000) and Rahmani and Yousefi (2009) . These studies also noted that corruption causes inflation to increase directly by increasing government expenditures and therefore budget deficit that is financed by seigniorage. However, there is an indirect channel through which corruption increase the inflation rate. Since the growth rate of GDP is lower when corruption is higher and since the inflationary effect of the growth in the money supply is higher when the growth rate of GDP is lower, the higher the inflation rate the higher is corruption.
3DESCRIPTION OF THE THEORETICAL MODEL
This section provides a detailed description of the theoretical model explicitly outlining its microfoundations. 6 The model economy consists of private households, public officials, firms and government as representative agents. Every agent tries to optimize its objective function subject to its constraints. The model links corruption motives of public officials and governance behavior of government with different political regimes. These links have implications for the role of corruption and governance on inflation and growth which are discussed in the results section of the paper. -12-
Agent's Preferences
The theoretical modelconsiders an economy inhabited by acontinuum of infinite-lived agents, At time t, the intertemporal utility function of the representative agent is specified as:
Where,
is a discount factor. It is assumed that utility function is separable in each of its argument and its specification is given as:
Where,  is elasticity of labor supply and 1   is weight associated with consumption of public good in the agents welfare function. Utility function (3.2) also follows standard assumption about increasing with diminishing return in each of its argument, i.e.,
Each agent maximizes his/her lifetime utility function (3.1) subject to the following intertemporal (flow) budget constraint:
-13-and a sequence of cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint: 
Where, 
Where, Barro (1990) 
From (3.12), we have, Following, Choudharyet. al, (2010), Hall and Jones (1999) and North (1990) , good governance is defined in terms of institutional credibility, effective laws/regulations and infrastructure stability which favors production process.
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These FOC's simply state that on optimum marginal products are equal to their respective prices. Further due to the consideration of Walrasian features, there is no markup associated with any price.
Behavior of Bureaucratic Corruption across Political Regimes
In order to model bureaucratic corruption, it is assumed that afraction,
, of public officials is involved incorruption by embezzling public funds. This creates a leakage in thegovernment revenues which puts pressures on government to make lessexpenditure on public infrastructure. This can be observed by simply linking corruption with governance efficiency scale. Following, Svensson (1995) we assume that  is inversely linked with  .
Therefore, (3.16) can be written as:
This implies that an increase in the level of bureaucratic corruption leads toward less-effective governance. So in this way government can directlyaffect a firm's net-worth, an assumption consistent with Choudharyet. al (2010). However, outcome of this type of bureaucratic corruption isuncertain because of the changing nature of political regimes. An autocratic regime, where government aims at good governance, bears amonitoring cost in order to reduce the level of corruption.Following, Del Monte and Papagni (2001), it is assumed that onoptimal government imposes a penalty of getting caught, which isexactly equal to the monetary value of monitoring cost. While maintaining the assumption of risk neutrality, the bureaucrat maximizes expected profits as:
Where,  is the probability of getting caught which is defined as:
. This implies that as corruption rises, probability of getting caught also rises with the penalty rate  . The Optimization problem yields the following solution:
Hence, as penalty rate rises bureaucratic corruption reduces. Using (3.19) it is easy to define political regimes as politically stable and politically instable as:
In politically stable regime, as penalty rate rises, bureaucratic corruption reduces. This reduction causes increase in governance efficiency scale. It promotes favorable conditions for firms to produce more and on aggregate, the economy wide output increases.
Government
In our model economy, the government performs the following tasks. It receives tax revenues from firms in exchange of the governance it provides. Among these tax revenues, it makes expenditures on public infrastructure at the rate, 
is the remaining amount of public fundsafter corruption and m is the rate of growth in monetary base defined as:
. Therefore, in this way on aggregate both weak governance and corruption are positively associated with high inflationarydue to high dependency on monetary seigniorage and,reduce output by effecting firms's net-worth via (3.17) and (3.19) channels.
Hence, as(3.17), (3.19) and (3.20) confirm that as stable political regime comes into power, governance increases and bureaucratic corruption reduces thus increasingoutput and slowing down the inflationary process. Unstable political regime reverses the whole scenario. Therefore, both governance and corruption have different implications on inflation and growth in different political regimes.
Solution ofthe theoretical Model
Due to long run considerations, we will restrict our model solution to the balance growth equilibrium of the model. For simplicity, it is assumed that the steady state growth rate of all real variablesis  .For solution, we need to collect all equilibrium conditions of the model with the assumptions that capital and money markets are clear in the long run, i.e. 
In the balanced-growth path t C grows at a constant rate ) 1
Thus condition (e) implies:
By virtue of the binding CIA constraint (g), inflation is constant and inversely related to growth according to:
(f) and (g) also yield the following result:
In aggregate t x comprises the income of all agents as:
After simplification and substituting equilibrium conditions we have:
CIA and agents budget constraint simultaneously simplifies with equilibrium conditions as:
Substituting it in (m) we get:
After simplification we get:
Hence, (3.19) , (3.21) and (3.24) show that in the presence of corruption, an increase in governance inefficiency leads to inflationary pressure along with low economic growth.
4DESCRIPTION OF EMPIRICAL MODELS
This section briefly outlines the empirical setup by illustrating data, specification of econometric models and regime switching estimation methodology used in this paper. 
Data
Specification of the Econometric Models
Following standard practices, we specify two econometric models, one for the explanation of inflation and second for economic growth. The approach followed here is to add corruption and governance in both the models as explanatory variables along with the standard determinants of inflation and economic growth. In order to examine the interactions of governance and corruption with inflation and growth across different political regimes, we find it useful to estimate econometric models with Markov-Regime switching approach. This approach enables 
4.3Markov Regime Switching Approach
The Markov Regime Switching (hence after, MRS) modeling approach was originally introduced byGoldfeld and Quandt (1973) in the field of econometrics. Cosslett and Lee (1985) have extended this approach by providing iterative algorithms to compute likelihood functions. This seminal attempt was similar in spirit of the state-space modeling using Kalman filter approach.
Later, this approach hasbeen used extensively in various economic applications, including Hamilton (1989) 
The unobserved term S t can be eliminated by summing up all the possible values of it. The corresponding likelihood is:
This log-likelihood function from (4.2) can be written as:
This function is a weighted average of the density functions for multiple regimes, with weights being the probability of each regime. Finally this MRS representation is used to estimate the model with explanatory variables with endogenous regime switching.
For solution algorithms, Hamilton (1994) 
Given the m terms of transition probabilities probabilities are generated, it can provide an easy way to use the algorithm in Kim and Nelson (1999) to derive the filtered probabilities for S t using all the information up to time t.
THE RESULTS
This section provides a discussion ofthe main results based on calibration of the theoretical model and estimation of regime switching models of inflation and economic growth. Calibration results are presented in Appendix B,whereas estimation results are reported in Appendix C.
Calibration Results of the Theoretical Model
The deep parameter values for model calibrations are given in Table B1 Pakistan's economy. 10 Model simulation results for CPI inflation and real GDP growth are given 10 East, West Pakistan separation.
-26-in Table B2 and Figures B1, B2 and B3 of Appendix B.These results show that simulated series of the theoretical model closely mimic the actual series. The subsample results across different political regimes are also robust. It confirms the implications of the theoretical model that when any autocratic regime comes into power macroeconomic fundamentals tend to improve with slowdown in inflation, robust growth, and lower bureaucratic corruption due to good governance.
But in the case of democratic regimes, these results are reversed: governance becomes weak with increase in the level of corruption. Also, the elected governments tend to rely more on seigniorage to finance their expenditures with adverse consequences for inflation and growth.
The model calibration results also indicate that the model is quite suitable for analyzing the inflation dynamics in Pakistan: within sample inflation predictions outperform growth predictions which implies that inflation in Pakistan is more sensitive to political instability, corruption and poor governance.
5.2Estimation Results of Regime Switching Models
The estimation results 11 of regime switching models (RSM) are reported in Table C1 . Both econometric models of inflation and economic growth are subdivided into two forms: one with corruption and second with governance. This is due to computational simplicity as parameters associated with these variables are varying (not fixed) subject to regime change. It reduces computational complexity in terms of state selection and also provides independent smoothed probabilities at high and low frequencies across sub political regimes. Similarly, estimation results of growth models show trade openness as a positive and significant determinant of output growth, because it is associated with productivity improvements resulting from enhanced competitiveness.
The results of RSM1 and RSM2 show that Inflation is positively related to nominal exchange rate and negatively to output growth. Again being a net importer, any depreciation of local currency will have an adverse impact on inflation and economic growth. The government borrowing ratio is positively associated with inflation and negatively with output growth.The higher is the government borrowing from the domestic financial sector the higher will be the crowding out of the private sector resulting in low economic activity and low level of output growth.
The fiscal balance ratio is negatively related to inflation which basically shows that higher deficit is accompanied with higher inflation. As with the majority of developing countries, due to lower credit rating in international market, the main source of financing the fiscal deficit is borrowing from internal sources. Higher fiscal deficit affects the rate of inflation in two ways; firstby directly increasing inflation and, second by increasing the government borrowing which in turn impacts the rate of inflation. But surprisingly, it has a negative association with output growth which means that higher fiscal deficit will bring a higher level of output growth. The fiscal balance ratio is statistically significant in the model but its contribution in explaining output growth is marginal.
The private sector credit is negatively associated with inflation, which shows that private sector credit stimulates output which helps in curtailing inflation. This result is in contrast with earlier findings. Although private sector credit is statistically significant but its contribution in the explanation of inflation in the model is marginal. The private sector credit is positively related to output growth showing that access to the financial resourcesstimulates economic activity and hence output growth.
As Pakistan is a net oil importer, inflation is positively related to international oil 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study mainly focuses on analyzing the consequences of political instability, governance and bureaucratic corruption on inflation and growth in the case of Pakistan. A representative agent model with micro-foundations and two Markov-Regime switching models of inflation and growth have been used. The analyses based on both these approaches show that high corruption along with weak governance cause high inflation and low growth. In an environment with weak governance, agents enhance their level of corruption resulting in leakages in public revenues and forcing the government to rely on seigniorage to finance public expenditures with adverse consequences for inflation and economic growth. Based on stylized facts, the paper shows that both corruption and poor governance typically coincide with political instability during the democratic regimes signifying the critical need to achieve political stability and to enhance the quality of governance for better economic outcomes.
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Appendix-A
VAR8 Fiscal Balance Ratio
Fiscal Balance Ratio is computed by taking ratio of total budget balance (total revenue -total expenditure) to nominal GDP. The data on fiscal balance is taken from Pakistan Economic Survey, various issues, MOF, Islamabad, Pakistan.
VAR9 Growth in Private Credit
The series is the annual growth rates of total private sector credit. -38- FY51  FY53  FY55  FY57  FY59  FY61  FY63  FY65  FY67  FY69  FY71  FY73  FY75  FY77  FY79  FY81  FY83  FY85  FY87  FY89  FY91  FY93  FY95  FY97  FY99  FY01  FY03  FY05  FY07  FY09 FY51  FY53  FY55  FY57  FY59  FY61  FY63  FY65  FY67  FY69  FY71  FY73  FY75  FY77  FY79  FY81  FY83  FY85  FY87  FY89  FY91  FY93  FY95  FY97  FY99  FY01  FY03  FY05  FY07  FY09  FY11 Probabilites of High Corruption Regimes Inflation Rate -39- FY51  FY53  FY55  FY57  FY59  FY61  FY63  FY65  FY67  FY69  FY71  FY73  FY75  FY77  FY79  FY81  FY83  FY85  FY87  FY89  FY91  FY93  FY95  FY97  FY99  FY01  FY03  FY05  FY07  FY09 FY51  FY53  FY55  FY57  FY59  FY61  FY63  FY65  FY67  FY69  FY71  FY73  FY75  FY77  FY79  FY81  FY83  FY85  FY87  FY89  FY91  FY93  FY95  FY97  FY99  FY01  FY03  FY05  FY07  FY09  FY11 Probabilites of High Governance Regimes Inflation Rate -40- FY51  FY53  FY55  FY57  FY59  FY61  FY63  FY65  FY67  FY69  FY71  FY73  FY75  FY77  FY79  FY81  FY83  FY85  FY87  FY89  FY91  FY93  FY95  FY97  FY99  FY01  FY03  FY05  FY07  FY09 FY51  FY53  FY55  FY57  FY59  FY61  FY63  FY65  FY67  FY69  FY71  FY73  FY75  FY77  FY79  FY81  FY83  FY85  FY87  FY89  FY91  FY93  FY95  FY97  FY99  FY01  FY03  FY05  FY07  FY09  FY11 Probabilites of High Corruption Regimes Output Growth -41- FY51  FY53  FY55  FY57  FY59  FY61  FY63  FY65  FY67  FY69  FY71  FY73  FY75  FY77  FY79  FY81  FY83  FY85  FY87  FY89  FY91  FY93  FY95  FY97  FY99  FY01  FY03  FY05  FY07  FY09 FY51  FY53  FY55  FY57  FY59  FY61  FY63  FY65  FY67  FY69  FY71  FY73  FY75  FY77  FY79  FY81  FY83  FY85  FY87  FY89  FY91  FY93  FY95  FY97  FY99  FY01  FY03  FY05  FY07  FY09  FY11 Probabilites of High Governance Regimes Output Growth
